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Expressive Association after Dale
David E. Bernstein

Abstract

The right to join with other people to promote a particular outlook, known as
the right of expressive association, is a necessary adjunct to the right of freedom
of speech, which is protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the United States Supreme Court found
that the Boy Scouts of America had a First Amendment expressive association
right to exclude a homosexual adult volunteer. Dale is likely to prove to be one
of the most important First Amendment cases of recent years, because the Court
enforced a broad right of expressive association against the competing claims of
an antidiscrimination law.
The right to expressive association had languished in obscurity for more than two
decades after the Supreme Court articulated it in the late 1950s and early 1960s
in the course of protecting civil rights activists from racist Southern governments.
Controversy over constitutional protection of expressive association arose in the
1980s, when private associations claimed that it protected their right to discriminate when necessary to pursue the associations’ goals. The Supreme Court seemed
aghast that the expressive association right was being used as a tool of those who
would seek to use its protection of their associative status in order to discriminate.
In a series of opinions in the mid to late 1980s, the Court both narrowly defined
the circumstances in which expressive association rights are impinged, and suggested that antidiscrimination laws are always “compelling government interests”
sufficient to override these rights. The right of expressive association had been
significantly weakened.
Dale, however, dramatically revived the right of expressive association. The Court
found that the Boy Scouts had an expressive association right to exclude gay scoutmasters even though the Scouts’ anti-homosexual activity policy was neither wellpublicized nor especially central to its mission. Moreover, the Court rejected New

Jersey’s claim that the law was justified by the state’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals.
The essay examines the right of expressive association and the consequences of its
reinvigoration by the Supreme Court in Dale. Part I recounts the ups and downs
of the right from its inception in civil rights cases, to its low ebb in the 1980s, to
its reinvigoration in Dale. Part II discusses some of the scholarly commentary on
Dale and concludes that the right to expressive association after Dale will continue
to be a broad one, with some limitations. Part III discusses some of the post-Dale
decisions that support the interpretation of Dale as expounding a broad-based expressive association right fully applicable to a variety of situations. Finally, Part
IV looks at some of the untapped potential uses of the right. In particular, Dale
will often shield religious associations from intrusive antidiscrimination laws.

EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AFTER Dale
by David E. Bernstein
Professor
George Mason University School of Law

INTRODUCTION
The right to join with other people to promote a particular outlook, known as the right of
expressive association, is a necessary adjunct to the right of freedom of speech, which is
protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Freedom of speech would
be of little practical consequence if the government could suppress ideas by bluntly prohibiting
individuals from gathering with others who share their perspective. Freedom of expression must
consist of more than the right to talk to oneself.
Freedom of speech could also be more subtly eroded if the government could force
organizations dedicated to promoting a particular perspective to accept as members individuals
who have a conflicting perspective. Such members would immediately dilute an organization’s
message because their membership would confuse public perceptions of the organization. In the
longer term, dissenting members forced upon an organization by the government could achieve
sufficient power to change the organization’s values. For example, if the government if a gay
rights organization in Mississippi could not control its membership, conservative Christian
activists could join and ultimately take over the organization. Conversely, a conservative
Christian organization in San Francisco banned from discriminating in selecting members would
be at risk of a takeover by gay rights activists.
Concerns about the autonomy of private, non-profit organizations recently led the United
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States Supreme Court to issue a rousing endorsement of the right of expressive association. In
the 2000 case of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,1 the Court found that because the Boy Scouts of
America (BSA) as an organization promotes a belief in chastity outside of marriage, the BSA had
a First Amendment expressive association right to exclude an openly homosexual adult
volunteer. Dale is likely to prove to be one of the most important First Amendment cases of
recent years, because the Court enforced a broad right of expressive association against the
competing claims of antidiscrimination laws.
The United States Supreme Court first articulated the right of expressive association in
the course of protecting civil rights activists from racist Southern governments in the late 1950s
and early 1960s. For the next two decades, the right to expressive association languished in
relative obscurity as few relevant cases were decided. Renewed controversy over constitutional
protection of expressive association arose in the 1980s, when private associations claimed the
right to discriminate in membership when such discrimination would aid the associations in
pursuing their goals.
The Supreme Court seemed aghast that the expressive association right, with its origins in
the civil rights struggle, had been embraced by those who sought to use it as a shield against
antidiscrimination laws. In a series of opinions in the mid to late 1980s, the Court both narrowly
defined the circumstances in which expressive association rights are impinged, and suggested
that antidiscrimination laws are always “compelling government interests” sufficient to override
these rights. Expressive association rights had become a virtual nullity, at least in cases
involving competing anti-discrimination claims.
Dale, however, dramatically revived the right of expressive association. The Court found
2
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that the Boy Scouts had an expressive association right to exclude gay scoutmasters even though
the Scouts’ anti-homosexual activity policy was neither well-publicized nor central to its
mission. Moreover, the Court rejected New Jersey’s claim that the law was justified by the
state’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination against homosexuals.
The essay will examine the right of expressive association and the consequences of its
reinvigoration at the hands of the Supreme Court in Dale. Part I recounts the ups and downs of
the right from its inception in civil rights cases almost fifty years ago, to its low ebb following
the Court’s 1984 decision in Roberts v. United States Jaycees,2 to its reinvigoration in Dale. Part
II will discuss reactions to Dale and conclude that after Dale expressive association rights will
receive vigorous, but not unlimited, protection. Part III will discuss post-Dale lower court
decisions that implicitly interpret Dale as adopting a broad-based expressive association right
fully applicable to a variety of situations. Finally, Part IV will look at some of the untapped
potential uses of the right of expressive association.
I.

THE RISE AND (TEMPORARY) FALL OF THE
RIGHT OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
The significance of Dale’s broad protection of the right of expressive association is

apparent when one considers the earlier trend established by the Court’s previous decisions in the
area. Pre-Dale decisions reflected an ebb and flow that saw the right develop from a powerful
shield for civil rights organizations to a neglected weak sibling of the First Amendment.
A.

Origins of the Right to Expressive Association

The first explicit recognition of the right of expressive association by the United States
Supreme Court came in the 1950’s, when the civil rights movement in the South was gathering
3
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steam. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,3 the question before the Court was whether the
State of Alabama—a state that rigorously enforced discriminatory laws against African
Americans—could compel the Alabama branch of the National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People, the leading civil rights organization in the state, to reveal to the state Attorney
General the names and addresses of its members. The state planned to turn these names over to
local “White Citizens’ Councils.” The state expected that the Councils would use the
information to help squelch the growing civil rights movement by harassing NAACP members.
Here we see an example of how expressive association rights are necessary for the exercise of
free speech rights; African Americans in the South could never have succeeded in promoting
their pro-civil rights message to the American public if the Southern states had been permitted to
decimate civil rights organizations like the NAACP.
The Court found that requiring the NAACP to turn over its membership lists illicitly
infringed on NAACP members’ right to expressive association. In discussing the right of
expressive association, the Court stated that “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of
speech.”4 The Court added that it was “immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters”; rather, regulation that
might have the effect of burden freedom of expressive association would receive “the closest
scrutiny.”5 Given the relatively minor benefit of disclosure to the State’s asserted interest of
determining whether the NAACP was engaged in technical violations of state law, the Court
determined that Alabama had failed to show a compelling interest sufficient to overcome the
4
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“deterrent effect on the free enjoyment of the right to associate” that compelled disclosure was
likely to have.6
Following Patterson, the Court decided several other expressive association cases pitting
the associational rights of the NAACP and its members against the obstructionist policies of state
governments in the South.7 In each of these cases, the Court applied strict scrutiny—the highest
level of scrutiny the Court gives to regulations, requiring that to pass constitutional muster a
regulation must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest—to the
asserted state interest involved and resolved the cases in favor of associational rights.8
Application of strict scrutiny is known as the “compelling interest test.”
While the Court strictly protected expressive association rights in cases involving racial
discrimination, such assertions by the Communist Party were less well received. In two cases in
the early 1960’s, the Court found that national security concerns overrode the Communist Party’s
freedom of association rights, upholding legislation requiring the Party to relinquish its
membership lists.9 The only case involving Communism from this era in which the Court sided
with expressive association also involved racial discrimination. In Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee,10 a committee of the Florida Legislature attempted to gain access to the
membership list of the Miami branch of the NAACP for the stated purpose of investigating
whether its members were involved with the Communist Party. The Court found that there was
no evidence of any substantial relationship between the NAACP and Communist activities, and
therefore no compelling state interest in acquiring the membership records.11
B.

A Shift in Focus Brings A Shift in Application

Expressive association cases largely died out for a time after the civil rights movement
5
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achieved its major legislative goals the 1960s, rendering moot attempts by state government to
stifle the movement, and with the end of the Red Scare of the 1950s. Ironically, the civil rights
movement’s legislative triumphs also sowed the sees for new litigation over expressive
association. Following the federal government’s lead, states began to either pass new laws or
enforce old laws guaranteeing African Americans and other beneficiaries of the civil rights
movement equal access to “places of public accommodation.” When these laws were passed,
legislatures had in mind restaurants, hotels, theaters, and other public spaces. Some state courts
gradually expanded their interpretations of public accommodation laws so that they covered
private membership organizations, even those with no permanent meeting places. The phrase
“place of public accommodation” was stretched to include the membership policies of these
organizations, despite the obvious semantic problem with fitting that particular square peg into
that particular round hole. States courts that applied public accommodation laws to membership
organizations held that they could not discriminate against protected groups with regard to their
membership policies. Thus, a new class of expressive association litigants was
born—membership organizations raising the right of expressive association as a defense against
antidiscrimination laws.
Roberts v. United States Jaycees12 involved the assertion of the right to expressive
association by a membership organization that sought exemption from a state public
accommodation law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex. At the time, the United
States Jaycees admitted only men between the ages of 18 and 35 as full members, although it
allowed women to be associate members with no voting or office-holding rights.13 In 1974 and
1975, two Minnesota chapters of the organization began admitting women as full members. The
6
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Jaycees’ national organization imposed sanctions against the chapters for this violation of
membership rules, and began proceedings to revoke their charters.14
The chapters then filed a complaint with the Minnesota Department of Human Rights,
contending that the Jaycees’ membership rules violated Minnesota’s law banning discrimination
in public accommodations.15 The national Jaycees sought relief against the law in federal court,
arguing that the law impinged on the right of expressive association.16 The Jaycees noted that
their charter called for the organization to “promote the interests of young men,” a presumptively
easier task for an organization with an all-male membership than for a mixed-sex organization.
The National Jaycees lost at the district court level, but won on appeal before the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.17 The Eighth Circuit held that the national Jaycees had a right to
associate as the means to achieve their expressive ends, including the advancement of the
interests of young men, and that allowing women as full members would directly burden that
right.18 The Eighth Circuit also found that Minnesota’s asserted compelling interest, the
prevention of discrimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of sex, was not
sufficiently compelling to overcome the national Jaycees’ right to expressive association.19
Minnesota appealed, and the United States Supreme Court, reversed the Eighth Circuit’s
ruling. Justice William Brennan wrote the 5-0 opinion for the Court. Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor filed a concurring opinion, Justice William Rehnquist concurred without an opinion,
and two Justices did not participate. Brennan’s opinion, while acknowledging a broad right to
expressive association, and recognizing that the central purpose of the national Jaycees was the
promotion of the interests of young men, held that forcing the organization to admit women as
full members would not impact the national Jaycees’ right to expressive association.20 Brennan
7
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stated that there was no evidence that the admission of women would substantially impair the
organization’s promotion of the interests of young men, and that without further evidence he
would “decline to indulge in the sexual stereotyping that underlies appellee’s contention that, by
allowing women to vote, application of the Minnesota Act will change the content or impact of
the organization’s speech.”21
Brennan added that even if Minnesota’s public accommodations law did impinge on
expressive association, and the Court therefore had to apply strict scrutiny, the law served
Minnesota’s compelling interest in eliminating discrimination and ensuring its citizens equal
access to publicly available goods and services. Moreover, the law was the law was narrowly
tailored because it abridged the National Jaycees’ expressive association rights only insofar as it
was necessary to accomplish the Act’s purpose.22 Brennan also suggested that discriminatory
practices were analogous to “violence or other types of potentially expressive activities that
produce special harms distinct from their communicative impact” and that such activities were
“entitled to no constitutional protection”.23
Brennan’s opinion in Roberts is significant in two respects. First, Brennan tendentiously
interpreted the facts to find that expressive association rights were not impinged. Brennan’s
assertion that it is merely stereotypical thinking to assume that women as a group are less
inclined than young men as a group to desire to promote the interests of young men seems almost
laughable.24 Second, and even more significant, Brennan characterized the Jaycees’
discriminatory practices as akin to violence and not worthy of constitutional protection, and
therefore gave the right of expressive association short shrift in his compelling interest analysis.
In adopting this argument, the Court sent the message that expressive association was far less
8
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important than other First Amendment rights.25
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Roberts was far narrower. She recognized that
an association’s right to define its membership is an important part of the right of expressive
association. She nevertheless believed that the Jaycees were not entitled to claim the right
because they were primarily a “commercial” association—providing networking contacts to
young businesspeople—rather than a primarily expressive one.26
After the Roberts opinion, the Court rejected two other expressive association challenges
to public accommodations laws, and in doing so reinforcing the idea that the right to expressive
association was a weak constitutional right at best.27 In Board of Directors of Rotary
International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, the Court held that Rotary International, a membership
organization, could not revoke the membership of a local Rotary Club that admitted two female
members in violation of Rotary International’s policy. As in Roberts, the Duarte Court argued
that requiring the admission of female members would not hinder the advancement of the club’s
purposes.28 The Court also applied the same lax version of strict scrutiny it had used in Roberts,
finding that any infringement on the right to expressive association was justified by the State’s
compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women.29
Similarly, in N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, the Court brushed aside a
challenge by a consortium of New York private clubs and associations to the application of the
New York City Human Rights Laws’ antidiscrimination provision. While acknowledging the
existence of a right to expressive association, the Court stated that the New York law at issue did
not on its face “affect ‘in any significant way’ the ability of individuals to form associations that
will advocate public or private viewpoints.”30
9
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The Court’s apparent disdain for expressive association claims had marked effect on
lower courts. Following the Brennan’s opinion in Roberts, lower federal courts and state
supreme courts routinely held that the right of expressive association had to yield to
antidiscrimination statutes.31
C.

The Tide Begins to Turn

From the mid-1980’s to 1995, protection of the right of expressive association was at a
low ebb, with courts generally refusing to enforce it in the face of conflicting antidiscrimination
legislation. However, the tide began to turn in favor of expressive association, beginning with
the 1995 Supreme Court opinion in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of
Boston.32
In Hurley, the Boston Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group (GLIB) sought to
require the organizers of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade to allow the organization to march
under its own banner. GLIB argued that the privately-sponsored parade was subject to
Massachusetts’ public accommodations law, which banned discrimination against
homosexuals.33 The organizers of the parade countered that the admission of GLIB to the parade
would violate their right to expressive association by forcing them to convey a sexual message.34
The trial court, following the Roberts methodology, found that any burden on the
organizers right to expressive association caused by allowing GLIB to march in the parade was
merely “incidental.”35 Further, the trial court held that this incidental burden was justified by
Massachusetts’ interest in “eradicating discrimination.”36 The Massachusetts Supreme Court
affirmed.37
However, the United States Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion written by
10
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Justice David Souter. The Court noted that the organizers of the parade disclaimed any interest
in excluding homosexuals generally from the parade, but rather were seeking to bar GLIB from
marching as its own parade unit under its own banner. The Court stated that “[s]ince every
participating unit affects the message conveyed by the private organizers, the state courts’
application of the statute produced an order essentially requiring petitioners to alter the
expressive content of their parade.”38 Thus, according to the Court, the Massachusetts’ courts’
application of the public accommodations statute had the effect of “declaring the sponsor’s
speech itself to be the public accommodation,” which was contrary to the fundamental rule of the
First Amendment that “a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message.”39
The Court distinguished Roberts, as well as New York State Club Association, by noting
that in those cases “compelled access to the benefit [provided by the organization] . . . did not
trespass on the organization’s message itself.”40 Here, according to the Court, even if the parade
could be called a public accommodation, “GLIB could still be refused admission as its own
parade unit in the same manner that a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest
views were at odds with a position taken by the club’s existing members.”41 Interestingly, there
was no mention of the compelling interest test.
The Court’s decision in Hurley seemed to halt the trend away from protection of the right
to expressive association, but its implications were somewhat ambiguous. The Hurley opinion
was unclear as to whether its holding relied on the right to expressive association or on the right
to free speech, and whether there was a meaningful distinction between these two rights.
However, the Court’s decision in Dale soon initiated a dramatic change in the legal status of the
right to expressive association.
11
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D.

Dale: The Right Reinvigorated

The issue in Dale was whether the Boy Scouts of America (BSA), could revoke the
membership of an assistant scoutmaster due to his acknowledged (and publicly-known)
homosexuality. Dale had become active in scouting at the age of eight, and had continued his
involving through age eighteen, ultimately achieving the rank of Eagle Scout.42 He applied for
adult membership in the Boy Scouts, and was approved for the position of assistant scoutmaster
for a Boy Scout Troop. In 1989, Dale left home to attend college, and there first acknowledged
his homosexuality. While at college, he attained a leadership position in a campus group
advocating homosexual interests.43 In July 1990, a newspaper published an interview it had
conducted with Dale at a seminar addressing the psychological and health needs of homosexual
teenagers. In the article, which was accompanied by Dale’s photograph and identified his
leadership position with the campus advocacy group, Dale spoke about his advocacy of
homosexual teens’ need for homosexual role models.44
Following the publication of the article, Dale received a letter from the local scouting
council revoking his membership on the basis that the “the Boy Scouts ‘specifically forbid
membership to homosexuals.’”45 Dale filed a complaint against the BSA in state court, alleging
that the revocation of his membership had violated New Jersey’s public accommodations
statute.46
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the BSA. The court held, among
other things, that the BSA’s position with regard to homosexuality was clear and that forcing the
BSA to allow Dale to be an adult member and scout leader would violate the BSA’s right to
expressive association.47 The New Jersey Superior Court of Appeals, however, reversed.48 With
12
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regard to the right to expressive association, the Court of Appeals, in a very Roberts-like opinion,
first determined that forcing the BSA to allow Dale as a member would not significantly affect
the BSA’s ability to express its views or carry out its interests.49 The court then distinguished
Hurley, determining that it had involved “pure forms of speech” rather than expressive
association, and that Hurley’s reference to expressive association was dicta.50 The court also
followed Roberts’s lead by applying a weak version of strict scrutiny and concluding that any
infringement was justified by New Jersey’s compelling interest in eradicating discrimination.51
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed.52 The court found that the forced inclusion of
Dale as a member would not significantly affect the ability of the BSA to disseminate its
message, because the BSA did not associate to promote the message that homosexuality is
immoral.53 The court invoked Roberts for the proposition that “[s]tate laws against
discrimination may take precedence over the right of expressive association because ‘acts of
invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services and other
advantages cause unique evils that the government has a compelling interest to prevent.”54
Finally, the court determined that any infringement on the BSA’s right to expressive association
was justified by the New Jersey’s compelling interest in preventing discrimination.55
The opinions of the New Jersey Superior Court of Appeals and the New Jersey Supreme
Courts were consistent with the expressive association doctrine the United States Supreme Court
had developed in Roberts and it progeny. However, the U.S. Supreme Court’s reversed the lower
courts’ holdings in 5-4 opinion written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist.
In Dale, the Court started off by noting that in Roberts, Duarte and New York State Club
Association it had applied the compelling interest test to public accommodations laws that
13
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allegedly infringed on associational rights. The Court, however, then emphasized that “forced
inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes on the group’s freedom of expressive
association if the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group’s ability to
advocate public or private viewpoints.”56 Then, in contrast its rulings in the Roberts line of
cases, in which the Court had carefully evaluated whether the antidiscrimination laws in question
truly infringed on the organizations’ expressive activities, the majority opinion in Dale stated that
“it is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed values because they disagree with
those values or find them internally inconsistent.”57 The Court noted that the record contained
evidence of the BSA’s belief that homosexual conduct is not “morally straight,” and declined
further inquiry into the sincerity of that belief.58
In further contrast to the dismissive manner in which the Court in Roberts and its progeny
had determined whether expressive association rights were impaired, the majority in Dale stated
that deference should be given to an organization’s view of what would impair its expression.59
The Court concluded, analogizing the case to Hurley, that “the presence of Dale as an assistant
scoutmaster would just as surely interfere with the Boy Scouts’ choice not to propound a point of
view contrary to its beliefs.”60 In determining that Dale’s inclusion would significantly affect the
BSA’s right of expressive association, the Court rejected the New Jersey Supreme Court’s
finding that there was no significant impairment because the purpose of the BSA’s association
was not to disseminate the belief that homosexuality is immoral. The U.S. Supreme Court found
that: (1) associations do not have to associate for the purpose of disseminating a specific message
to be entitled to First Amendment protection; (2) even if the BSA discourages leaders from
disseminating views on sexual issues, this does not negate the sincerity of its belief that
14
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homosexuality is immoral; and (3) the First Amendment simply does not require that every
member of a group agree on every issue in order for the group’s policy to be “expressive
association.”61
The Court proceeded to apply the compelling interest test. The Roberts line of cases
suggested that the compelling interest test always justified antidiscrimination laws challenged on
expressive association grounds. In Dale, the Court gave the test short shrift, stating simply that
“[t]he state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations law do not justify such a
severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association.”62 Dale left no
doubt that the compelling interest test as used in Roberts and its progeny, through which a state’s
interest in eradicating discrimination always trumped expressive association rights, had been
repudiated. Even though Dale was a 5-4 decision, not even the dissenters argued for the use of
the Roberts-style compelling interest test.63 Rather, the dissenters argued that the BSA’s antihomosexual activity message was too vague, unpublicized, and irrelevant to the organization’s
core mission to warrant protection under the expressive association paradigm.
The majority opinion in Dale marks a substantial step toward the recognition of
expressive association as a full-fledged First Amendment right with the same weight as the
general right of free speech. The right to expressive association had been treated by Roberts and
its progeny as a second-class right, which could be infringed upon in most instances due to the
narrow definition of an association’s expressive interests and the lax nature of the compelling
interest test that the Court used in those cases. Dale, in contrast, held that the expressive
association right could be asserted by an organization even though the organization does not
associate for the purpose of expressing a particular message, propounds that message only
15
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implicitly, and tolerates dissenting views. Moreover, under Dale the courts will no longer defer
to governments’ claims that their invasions of expressive association rights serve interests
sufficiently compelling to justify those invasions, but will instead skeptically review such
claims.
II.

REACTION TO DALE
Reaction to Dale and its possible implications has been mixed, and ranges across a wide

spectrum of constitutional philosophy. On one extreme is Richard Epstein, who applauds the
Court for its reinvigorated enforcement of the right to expressive association, yet argues that the
Court’s opinion did not go far enough, and that the Court should have recognized that the state
has no interest in counteracting discrimination by groups that lack monopoly power.64 According
to Epstein, Dale’s reasoning should be extended to non-expressive organizations, including forprofit businesses not organized for a particular expressive purpose: if the First Amendment
applies, as the Dale opinion suggests, to all situations where the organization merely engages in
expressive activity that could be impaired, then “every organization engages in expressive
activity when it projects itself to its own members and to the rest of the world.”65
Epstein argues that courts should not apply a comprehensive test that would attempt to
apply the government’s interest in antidiscrimination legislation to “to the literally thousands of
organizations that engage in business, charitable, religious, or recreational endeavors, or some
mixture thereof.” Rather, courts should adopt a test that recognizes a broad unity between the
rules that treat private property, freedom of contract and freedom of speech as equals, allowing
state regulation only under the traditional police power grounds, such as the prevention of
monopolies.66 Today, by contrast, property and contract rights are given short shrift by the courts
16

http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art33

relative to freedom of speech.
While Epstein argues that Dale did not go far enough, Andrew Koppelman argues that the
Dale opinion is “sheer lunacy.”67 Like Epstein, Koppelman agrees that under the Court’s opinion
in Dale, “almost any organization is eligible for the protection from antidiscrimination laws that
the Court provides.”68 Koppelman contends that the Court’s statement that an association need
only engage in expressive activity that could be impaired in order to receive protection, coupled
with its statement that it will not question the association’s statement of its expressive purpose
and will defer to the association’s view of what would impair that purpose, means that “an
expressive association claim is available to any entity that wants to discriminate at any time for
any purpose.”69
Others scholars contend that Dale’s impact won’t be so dramatic. Dale Carpenter argues
that Dale will not have “the revolutionary consequences” that either its “harshest critics,” such as
Koppelman, or “most libertarian cheerleaders,” such as Epstein, predict.70 He contends that the
crucial distinction the Court will make after Dale in the area of expressive association will be
akin to the approach suggested by Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Roberts. The Court will
provide Dale’s heightened protection to organizations whose activities are primarily expressive,
while other groups whose activities are primarily commercial will receive a minimal level of
protection.71 Carpenter contends that this distinction is also somewhat analogous to the Court’s
treatment of core political and commercial speech.72 He also argues that this distinction is
consistent with the results in both Roberts and Dale because the Jaycees was a primarily
commercial organization, while the BSA is primarily expressive. Carpenter concludes that
“there is little doubt that a majority of the Court is now following Justice O’Connor’s approach
17
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to associational freedom,” even though Dale did not articulate this explicitly. 73
Other scholars have suggested that Dale does not signal a complete repudiation of the
Roberts standard, but is rather an anomaly generated by the parties involved: the venerable
institution of the BSA on the one hand, and the homosexual minority and their tenuous social and
legal status on the other.74 In particular, commentators who hold this view argue that the Court’s
ruling would have been different in a case concerning race or sex discrimination.75 Some
attribute this difference to the Court’s majority’s lack of sympathy for gay rights, suggesting that
the Court believes that eradicating discrimination against African Americans or women, but not
gays, is a compelling government interest.
Others have suggested that the source of the distinction between cases involving gays and
other expressive associations is the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence. For equal protection
purposes, the Court engages in strict scrutiny of laws that classify by race (requiring that the
classification at issue be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest),
intermediate scrutiny of laws that classify by sex (requiring a that the classification serve
important government interests and be substantially related to the achievement of that goal), and
rational basis scrutiny (requiring merely that a classification be rationally related to a legitimate
state interest rest on grounds not wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective) for
laws that classify by sexual orientation. Antidiscrimination laws will be protected from
expressive association claims under the compelling interest test based on the degree of protection
the group facing discrimination receives under equal protection doctrine. It should be noted that
scholars who hold such views are speculating, and that there is nothing in Dale that suggests that
race discrimination cases would get treated differently than sexual orientation discrimination
18
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cases. Quite the contrary, the Court wrote that “public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an
organization's expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization to accept
members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization's expressive message.”76
It seems likely that Dale does mark a turning point in the judicial treatment of the right of
expressive association, regardless of which group is harmed by the discrimination at issue. In
contrast to the limited and toothless right given lip service by the Court in Roberts, Dale
establishes expressive association as a robust First Amendment right. I agree with Professor
Carpenter that the right to expressive association is likely limited by the primarily expressive/
primarily commercial dichotomy that Justice O’Connor enunciated in her concurrence in
Roberts. Justice O’Connor’s vote was necessary to secure the 5-4 majority in Dale, and its result
is consistent with the application of the dichotomy of her Roberts concurrence, thus suggesting
that Dale does not represent a change in her views The defense of the right of expressive
association is probably limited solely to nonprofit organizations, as it would be difficult to argue
that a profit-making enterprise exists primarily for noncommercial purposes.
III.

CASE LAW FOLLOWING DALE
The Supreme Court has not addressed the right of expressive association since Dale.

However, the limited cases in the lower courts since Dale generally support the theory that Dale
has ushered in a new era of broad protection of the right to expressive association. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, relied in part on Dale in holding that the Department of
Housing and Urban Development could not launch a civil rights investigation against
homeowners who, for allegedly discriminatory reasons, organized opposition a plan to turn a
motel into a group home. The court cited Dale for the proposition that “[t]he right to expressive
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association includes the right to pursue, as a group, discriminatory policies that are antithetical to
the concept of equality for all persons.”77
In Donaldson v. Farrakhan78 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts found that forcing a
Nation of Islam mosque to admit a woman to a men’s-only religious meeting would significantly
burden the organization’s right of expressive association, and was not justified by a compelling
government interest. This decision belies the notion that Dale’s holding is applicable only to
cases involving discrimination against homosexuals, and that Roberts’s forgiving compelling
interest test would otherwise apply. Had the Massachusetts Supreme Court relied on Roberts
rather than Dale, the public accommodations statute would have prevailed as serving the
compelling interest of eradicating discrimination against women.
Further evidence that the Roberts inquiry is no longer viable after Dale was provided by
the D.C. Court of Appeals in Boy Scouts of America v. District of Columbia Commission on
Human Rights.79 This case, like Dale, involved the question of whether the BSA could deny
membership to homosexuals. The D.C. Commission on Human Rights had found that the BSA
could not claim an expressive association right to exclude homosexuals. The Commission had
tried to distinguish Dale by arguing that it had conducted its own detailed examination of the
BSA’s views with regard to homosexuality and concluded that the BSA did not truly express a
position on the morality of homosexual relations.80 On appeal by the BSA, the D.C. Court of
Appeals rejected the Commission on Human Rights’ attempt to rely upon a Roberts-style
detailed examination of the expressive position of the organization.81 Instead, the court found
Dale to be controlling and ruled in favor of the BSA.
There has, however, been one case decided by the Third Circuit that has some restrictive
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implications for the right of expressive association. In Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v.
University of Pittsburgh,82 a fraternity that had been stripped of its status as a recognized student
organization following a drug raid raised the right of expressive association in a lawsuit against
the university. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, not surprisingly, rejected the fraternity’s
claim.83 However, as part of its analysis, the court determined that the fraternity was not engaged
in expressive activity sufficient to qualify for First Amendment protection.84 In reaching this
conclusion, the court engaged in an extensive analysis of the fraternity chapter’s activities,
finding that it did nothing to perpetuate what the purported associational ideals of the national
fraternity. 85 The court held that the chapter was therefore not engaged in expressive activity. 86
The court added that even if the fraternity was engaged in expressive activity, the University’s
conduct did not significantly infringe upon it.87
Although the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ ultimate conclusion that the University’s
actions did not infringe on the fraternity’s right of expressive association is correct, the court’s
determination that the fraternity was not engaged in expressive activity is belied by Dale. First,
like Roberts but unlike Dale, the court analyzed of validity of the organization’s expressive
beliefs while ignoring its stated expressive purpose. Second, the court employed a highly
restrictive definition of expressive behavior which equated the fraternal organization at issue
with a for-profit dance club. Such a restrictive definition seems inconsistent with Dale’s broadbased definition of expressive activity.88 Although ultimately not necessary to its conclusion, the
Third Circuit’s analysis in Pi Lambda Phi serves notice that the specter of Roberts still haunts the
area of expressive association.
IV.

THE FUTURE OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION
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Although the newly reinvigorated right of expressive association has seen only limited
use in the short time since the Supreme Court’s decision in Dale, it has enormous potential to
effect the law in a variety of areas. One of those areas concerns the expressive association of
religious organizations. Prior to Dale, religious associations who were burden by
antidiscrimination laws which conflicted with there religious beliefs were forced to rely on Free
Exercise Clause arguments.89 These claims were rarely successful, and with the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Employment Division v. Smith90 that religious organizations had no right to be exempted
from neutral, generally-applicable laws that burden their free exercise of religion, even this small
chance of success faded.
After Dale, however, a religious association confronted with an antidiscrimination law
that requires it to act in a way that inhibits its ability to promote its beliefs should be able to raise
expressive association rights as a defense. For example, church schools have a right to fire
unmarried teachers who become pregnant if sex outside of marriage is frowned on by their
sponsoring church.91 Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Good News Club v. Milford Central
School,92 arguing that a public school’s exclusion of a Christian student club from the use of
school facilities impinges on the right of expressive association, is an indication that religious
organizations will be among the beneficiaries of Dale.
Universities will also be a primary benefactor of the newly invigorated right of expressive
association. The right of expressive association may be used to protect a private university’s
speech code against state statutes such as California’s “Leonard Law,” which requires private
schools to follow the First Amendment requirements in regulating speech. A private university
could conceivably win such an expressive association case if it can show that it is committed to
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maintaining a campus environment that is more open and inclusive to minority students, even at
the expense of free speech on campus.93 The First Amendment, which only restricts
governmental activity, exists to protect pluralism from government attempts to impose
orthodoxy, not to impose a free speech orthodoxy on private institutions. Protecting the
expressive association rights of universities may decrease free speech on particular campuses, but
overall increases social and ideological pluralism by allowing universities to choose their
identities, and to lure like-minded faculty and students based on those identities.
If forced to make an explicit choice, many universities would undoubtedly choose to
promote themselves as free speech havens, as many already have. Yale University, for example,
has volunteered that it will not punish any speech on campus if that speech would be protected by
the First Amendment protects against government action. Other universities would establish
themselves as institutions devoted to particular religious and social ideologies, as many implicitly
or explicitly already have. As Professor Randall Kennedy of Harvard Law School suggests, the
proper response to private sector experimentation with speech rules is to “let a thousand flowers
bloom.”94 Freedom of speech and expressive association must include the right of private
institutions to determine what speech they will and will not countenance.
Expressive association rights for speech codes are only necessary in the few jurisdictions
like California where speech codes at private universities are illegal. A broader potential use for
the right of expressive association by universities nationwide would be to protect affirmative
action racial preferences in admission from laws banning discrimination in admissions. The
United States Supreme Court recently held that such preferences are generally allowed,95 but the
decision was 5-4, with one of the Justices in the majority, Sandra Day O’Connor, rumored to be
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ready to retire soon. Moreover, while the Court’s opinion permitted preferences, it did ban some
commonly-practiced admissions tactics, including giving all African American applicants a
blanket edge in admissions, regardless of individual circumstances.
The right of expressive association, however, may provide a defense to private
universities that seek to avoid any present or future restrictions on affirmative action. Under
Dale, universities can assert that they have a commitment to the promotion of racial diversity and
assistance to disadvantaged minorities, and that the application of laws prohibiting racial
preferences will significantly burden that right.96
This approach is not perfect. Asserting a First Amendment defense against Title VI may
be unavailing in the face of the Court’s decision in Grove City College v. Bell.97 In that case, the
Court held that universities that receive federal funds could not claim a First Amendment right to
refuse to comply with intrusive regulations promulgated by the federal government. The Court
held the First Amendment was inapplicable because universities were not coerced into obeying
Title IX regulations, and could evade them by simply refusing federal funds.98 In theory, a court
might similarly hold statutory restrictions on affirmative action do not violate the First
Amendment for the same reason. However, as I have argued elsewhere, Grove City may not in
fact be applicable, especially because the negative consequences for universities that disobey
federal guidelines have grown dramatically since the Court decided that case.99
CONCLUSION
The full magnitude of the change to the jurisprudence of the right of expressive
association wrought by the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision in Dale is still not clear. What is
apparent is that Dale failed to follow the Roberts line of cases, and instead rejuvenated the right
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of expressive association. The right emerged from the decision in Dale as a robust shield for
expressive associations against government attempts to directly or indirectly influence their
ability to independently form and promote their messages. Further, although the lower court
decisions are sparse and sometimes inconsistent, it appears that this expansive definition of the
right has application beyond the facts and circumstances in Dale, although the scope of that right
is neither as broad as some commentators have argued. Expressive association rights will limit
the encroachment of antidiscrimination laws on the membership and employment policies of
nonprofit associations, but will not provide a means for American businesses to evade those
laws.
Much of the potential of the right of expressive association, however, remains untapped.
In particular, as interpreted by Dale, the right of expressive association has great possibilities for
use by religious organizations and private universities faced with antidiscrimination laws that
would interfere with their ability to promote their ideologies. Expressive association may also
ultimately protect the affirmative action policies of private universities from government
intrusion.
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